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3Introduction
This paper is concerned with the role of International
Humanitarian Aid (IHA) in the context of development as applied to the
case of Rwanda. The general issue as well as the case are particularly
relevant to the policy process of CIDA since, not only is the concern
with Basic Human Needs one of the six foci of the objectives of CIDA,
but the other interests of CIDA, particularly the concern with Human
Rights, Democracy and Good Governance, are directly impacted by
humanitarian aid. I am not referring merely to the rapid increase in
the proportion of the budget of all aid agencies around the world
devoted to humanitarian assistance - an increase from 2% to 10% of
overseas aid in the last ten years - in the context of a significantly
diminished overall budget and, thus, the rapidly decreasing amount of
funds available for those other objectives. Nor am I primarily
concerned with donor fatigue, the perceived diminution in support for
development aid and, to some degree, humanitarian aid. Rather, the
concern is with the connection between the role of development in
creating the need for humanitarian aid, and, in turn, the role of
humanitarian aid in creating an enormous need for more development. 
Let me explain. Over and over the mantra of the continuity between
aid, rehabilitation and development has been repeated. Basically, the
proposition has been espoused that aid should not be offered in
isolation, but should help prepare a country or a region affected by a
complex emergency to rebuild itself and resume its place on the path to
development. The crisis is seen as a disruption of a normal trajectory
in which the aid fills the gap and restores the vehicle - in this case
the state or even a region - back onto the track of self-propulsion.
Development is the norm. Conflict and disruption are disruptive
intervening variables. Aid is the emergency assistance, like a pit stop
or an emergency centre in a major hospital which receives accident
victims. The objective is to get the patient back on the road to
recovery so that the society can be put back to work and resume its
pattern of development.
I want to reverse this perspective. Instead of examining aid as
something totally other than development that is brought in from the
outside when the development process is disrupted by natural or human
disasters, particularly the latter, the crisis itself may be a by-
product of development, and aid a natural correlate, like the vast and
accelerating amounts of garbage produced by industrialized societies,
and, hence, the need for more and more garbage trucks to haul away the
waste to dumps, or, more frequently now, to recycling centres. Has
humanitarian aid merely become the recycling component within the
4development ideology?
To answer the question, I want to summarize the development of
development theory itself since World War II. (The full exposition is
in a separate paper - "The Dialectic of Development: Theory and
Practice.") I then want to zero in on Basic Needs Theory, not simply as
it was initially enunciated as a theory of development, but as it
evolved into a theory of behaviour of behaviour for the analysis,
prevention and resolution of conflict. I will then apply the analysis
to Rwanda, and, more particularly, to the delivery of humanitarian aid
to Rwanda. Finally, I will conclude by placing this analysis within
current trends of placing both development and humanitarian assistance
within the framework of foreign policy and security issues rather than
as a field protected by a lead shield from the radiation effects of
foreign policy dominated by self-interest and security concerns.
The Development of Development Theory and Practice
Development aid by states (as distinct from philanthropic
organizations1) began after World War II as part of the Cold War in the
effort to assist states to recover from that conflict lest, in the
chaos and mayhem and sense of desperation, they drift into the
communist orbit. This was particularly true when Truman's Marshall Plan
was extended in 1949 to apply to countries outside Europe. 
Economic development assistance was connected with political
classical realism which explained states' actions through a theory
about human nature. Human beings are driven by their passions and
assumed to be interested primarily in self-preservation and enhancement
of their power.2 The United States would help others because it was in
America's economic and security interests to do so.
But if self-interest in terms of security provided the motive for
development assistance, the rationale for that assistance in economic
theory was liberal or Keynesian. "After the second World War
governments were influenced by the international acceptance of
macroeconomic policies, i.e. state intervention through financial and
monetary policies to reduce the high levels of unemployment." (Svendsen
1995, 37) Canada joined the Colombo Plan to stop communism by fostering
national liberation as well as economic and social progress. In the
original development theory, money was dispensed to Third World states
to gain security. Growth may have been the rationale, but security was
the motive. 
Then came the first and fundamental turning point. By the mid
51950s, the priorities were reversed. Instead of using aid to foster
security, security would be the by-product of economic and social
progress in "the recognition that the more quickly other people's
standards of living rise the better off we shall be...economic and
social progress are essential to a durable peace."3 Thus, in the
international arena, activist state intervention was seen as the key
catalyst is jump-starting stagnant economies onto a growth pattern.
(Rostow 1960) The development task was seen primarily as the need to
transfer capital and more productive technologies from North to South
to facilitate "take-off," that is, to provide a one-time initial thrust
to give a society its own momentum. Economic development assistance
became a goal in itself with the happy coincidence that greater
security would be one consequence.
The third stage in development theory came as a result of studies
which seemed to show that development was related to greater injustice
and inequity. There was an inverse correlation between economic growth
and equity of income distribution. As Adelman concluded (1975), "To
achieve equitable growth, two extreme strategies are in principle
possible: (1) grow now, redistribute and educate later; (2)
Redistribute and educate now, grow later." (322) A country could not
both grow and achieve equity at one and the same time. A second
theoretical reversal was proposed. Raise the educational levels and the
welfare of the vast majority of the population for a decade to
rationalize economic incentives before embarking on a program of rapid
economic growth. The strategy recommended initial resource distribution
followed by massive education and then a human-resource-oriented growth
as a foundation for stimulating economic growth. 
Dependency theory was the external correlate to the internalist
critique of the disjunction between development and equity. For
dependency theorists claimed that development assistance was simply one
aspect of a global enterprise intent of making Third World countries
peripheral parts of the global capitalist system. Underdevelopment was
not natural, but the direct product of the development ideology.
History and the distribution of political and economic power determined
both development and underdevelopment. 
Policies on redistribution and the satisfaction of 'basic needs'
were indirect responses to the dependency theory critics. (Leys 1996,
12, fn. 23) and a direct response to the critique on the divergence
between growth and equity. This approach entailed redistributing income
to those at the bottom with a consequent short term loss in gross
national income as well as savings, and therefore a loss in immediate
growth, as well as a larger role for the state. The results, however,
6promised better prospects for long term savings and growth as
investment in human capital laid the groundwork for faster future
growth. (Moon & Dixon 1992) Robert McNamara, officially propounded the
'basic needs' approach in a speech to the Board of Governors of the
bank in Nairobi in 1973.
It must be recalled that international aid agencies as separate
institutions were created in the sixties in Canada, Denmark, Sweden
just at the time when the new approach to development aid based on a
"basic needs" approach was emerging. Both bilateral and multilateral
programs stressed poverty alleviation and the satisfaction of basic
needs instead of relying on the automatic benefits that were previously
believed to flow from development assistance. Both advocated an
integrated, coherent approach to development in which technological and
capital transfers were balanced by social programs to reduce
inequalities and support for education. In Canada, by the late sixties
when CIDA was founded, "large infrastructural projects and commodity
aid still dominated the program - but, at the rhetorical level, more
attention was focused on rural development and social equality."
(Morrison 1996, 6)
The fourth stage in development theory took place in another
radical zig and zag in the eighties. And it created a definite
bifurcation as a result of the critiques levelled at development
theory. One source of criticism was Robert Bates and his followers.
Robert Bates (1981, 1987, and 1988), when he applied rational choice
theory to previous development policies, argued that even where there
was no significant corruption, the receiving state in a Keynesian
strategy tended to develop state controlled marketing boards for export
crops, government monopolies for purchasing food and to act de facto as
agents for private interests in industrialization. As a result, the
development projects aimed at fostering growth and a take-off were all
notorious failures on a macro scale because such policies lowered the
prices farmers received for their crops and increased their costs for
purchasing commodities. Further, when prices were subsidized for the
items farmers needed to grow their crops (fuel, for example), the
benefits of those subsidies were appropriated by a few rich large-scale
farmers. Because such policies were project rather than price-based,
that is, used to provide incentives for production by lowering input
costs rather than ensuring that prices of sold goods rose to the market
price, inefficiency was promoted because of market distortions, reduced
competition, and poorly conceived projects, a result identical to the
effects when the same policies were applied in the developed world. At
least this was the case Bates made so effectively.4
7His explanation was straightforward - the results were 'rational'
given the incentives put in place, that is, the ease of organization of
large-scale farmers, the development of urban support through cheap
food, the creation of patronage and profit opportunities for government
supporters, and, most importantly of all, the generation of rents which
politicians can use for various purposes, including ensuring their
continuation in power. (cf. Leys 1996, 88-89) Development aid, whether
for security, as an independent objective with security as a by-
product, or focused on resource redistribution and fostering education
and human-resource development, resulted in economic deformations and
inefficiencies which retarded rather than enhanced growth.
This fit in with a second critique that modernization theory had
directed at development theory. Modernization theorists5 argued that
though some external inputs fostered development, with an ignorance of
the society and culture, these economic inputs were more likely to set
back modernization. The transfer of technology, commodities, production
systems and ideas and knowledge could add to the obstacles to
development. The real object was to counter internal barriers to
modernization - traditional institutions, attitudes and values, the
distribution of power and legitimacy amongst a small elite, the use of
coercion for perpetuation of those elites in power rather than to
maintain law and order and secure the society against external threats.
The exclusive focus on the transfer of resources without regard to the
social make-up of the society and without a conscious, deliberate and
well-thought out plan for fostering institutional reform in a rational
and orderly manner, would produce far more failures than successes
overall.6 Development policy had to concentrate primarily on reforming
existing institutions and creating new ones through educational
assistance (scholarships abroad, training institutes), not only to
develop particular skills, but to change attitudes and values.7 
The issue then became - do you use development theory to minimize
injustice as in the basic needs theories developed in response to
dependency theory and the analysis that pointed to the divergency
between strategies aimed at growth and those aimed at equity, or do you
go forward in a different direction? Holding onto the first goal led to
ethical development theory. Those who advocated abandoning the old
approach, went in two different directions. One direction advocated
using development theory to change values and attitudes. The other
direction requiring states to change their behavioral and institutional
patterns as a condition of receiving development assistance - what
became known as the structural adjustment process. Given the
inaccessibility of changing attitudes and values directly, development
aid had to be directed to those structural components which most
8directly affected attitudes and values - education, property ownership,
administrative organization. 
 If development policy, both through the agencies dominated by the
United States as well as by social democratic states, was moving
towards balancing economic growth with norms of equity and efforts at
redistribution, there was a significant growth in military aid to
preserve stability and order as the ultimate goal of overseas
assistance by propping up and supporting praetorian regimes as a means
of modernization and transforming traditional institutions. Further,
development assistance, insofar as it fostered the creation of a home-
grown urban intelligentsia, could be a catalyst for revolution. In
other words, development assistance generally was impeded by
traditional sociological systems which created frustration and
demanding revolutionary changes through violent means. At the same
time, development assistance nurtured the very leaders of revolutionary
movements. Development assistance in quest of economic growth was not
the way to foster stability and, hence, security, but a catalyst for
revolution.
Modernization theory had a direct impact on foreign policy and the
emphasis on maintaining social order in Third World countries rather
than on development aid. For if development aid was continuously
deformed by internal barriers fostered by the sociology of traditional
societies, and those sociological structures continuously perverted the
goals of economic assistance, then aid could be used directly instead
of indirectly to assure stability and that western hegemony was not
threatened. The policy was carried out by arms transfers and assistance
related to supporting regimes to ensure that they did not fall into the
communist orbit.8 The efforts in Latin America are well known. Less well
known is the American efforts in Africa, specifically support of
Mobutu's coup in Zaire. 
Thus, development practice suffered from a multiple personality
disorder. On the one hand, the primary traditional approach was now the
once revolutionary basic needs approach which itself overlay a Keynsian
use of the state as an instrument to foster growth. These two
personalities which projected a positive view of development assistance
were counteracted by two other approaches. One was based on military
assistance and the battle for the hearts and minds of the people
against reactionary institutions. The other was based on structural
adjustment. Both were highly critical of the deformations allegedly
produced by the 'traditional' theories of development.
It was structural adjustment theory that impacted most directly
9on development policy. The critiques by the rational choice theorists
outlined in the account of Robert Bates induced the World Bank to shift
its goals. Economic growth and satisfying basic needs could best be
achieved as consequences of a very different goal - inducing structural
change in recipients of development aid. Robert Bates analysis had been
incorporated into the World Bank's Development Report for 1986.
Douglass North, who shared a Nobel Prize in 1993, published Structure
and Change in Economic History in 1981 and, like Bates, his ideas were
incorporated into the World Bank's Reports, specifically the 1987
Report as well as subsequent annual reports. (Cf. Leys 1996, ch. 4)
Structural adjustment had become the new development orthodoxy while
modernization theory became a fundamental assumption of foreign policy
by major powers.
What happened to basic needs?
Basic Human Needs Theory
The Case of Rwanda
Humanitarian and Development Aid, Security and Foreign Policy
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1. Prior to World War II, development work depended on private
foundations. The premises of development for foundations, such as the
Phelps-Stoke fund, were based on the expectation that African
countries would not be self-governing in the near future and that the
populations in such countries would serve as vocational workers in
the international capitalist system. Cf.Robert Arnove, ed. (1982)
Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and
Abroad, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, specifically, Edward
Berman, "Educational Colonialism in Africa: The Role of American
Foundations at Home and Abroad, 1910-1945," and "The Foundations Role
in American Foreign Policy: The Case of Africa, post 1945," 179-232.
2. "The school of [contemporary] realism is essentially Hobbesian in
that it (1) counts on the predictability of actors' motivation and
behaviour; (2) equates anarchy with constant fear, struggle, and
danger; (3) claims that the national interest, defined as self-
preservation and advancement against others, is a dictate of nature -
either a state obeys it or it is destroyed; (4) takes all other
motivations besides the national interest as irrational and dangerous
and therefore to be counselled against so that such motivations as
national pride and ideological or religious fervour cannot be
accounted for except as fatal anomalies or covers for power
interests; (5) disregards the character of individual leaders as
irrelevant, considering the overriding dictates of the international
power structure; (6) disregards political rhetoric because it is seen
as epiphenomenal; (7) counsels prudent adherence to the realist view
of the world put forth by the scientists of the realist paradigm,
thus claiming that science is a better source for political wisdom
than the cultivation of excellence in leaders and their followers."
(Johnson 1993, 70) Neo-realism or structural realism is a species of
conservative realism, but differs somewhat from the traditionalist
view. "(S)tructural realism or sometimes neo-realism deals only with
basic structural features of the international system: the
'anarchical nature of the system, the relative distribution of power,
and the importance of the balance of power..and attempts to transform
classical realism into a scientific-deductive theory that focuses on
the structure of the international system...It avoids questionable
assumptions, ambiguities, and contradictions that Waltz and other
scholars discerned in Morgenthau's writings with respect to the
central concepts of power, national interest, and balance of power."
(George 1993, 108)
3. Lester B. Pearson in a speech delivered to a Conference on
Canadian Aid to Underdeveloped Countries, Ottawa, May 1995, cited in
ENDNOTES
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Morrison (1996) 14 from a citation in McKinnell, R.T. and Tiedmann,
K.H., Canada's Development Aid, Ottawa: CIDA, May 1982, 3. For the
theoretical basis to this view, cf Lewis (1955).
4. For a critique of Bates analysis, cf. Leys 91996), ch. 4. In fact,
since I have concentrated on contradictions rather than lack of
comprehensiveness or inadequate empirical support for various
theories, Leys' book is an excellent place to find such criticisms of
most of the theories outlined in this paper.
5. The theoretician who gave voice to drawing the logical conclusions
of modernization theory was Samuel Huntington (1968). For an analysis
of Huntington's policies, see Colin Leys (1982) "Samuel Huntington &
the End of Classical Modernization Theory," in Hamza Alavi and Teodor
Shanin, eds., Introduction to the Sociology of Developing Societies,
New York: Monthly Review Press, 332-349, reprinted as chapter 3 of
Leys (1996), 64-79.
6. Adopting the critiques, Griffin and McKinley (1994), made
earlier by the modernization theorists, an argument was put forth
that aid, in many cases, retarded economic development by deforming
the local economy. "Second, where aid flows are large in relation to
the recipient's national product, relative prices are distorted in an
anti-development direction. Large inflows of foreign aid tend to
result in an appreciation of the exchange rate, thereby discouraging
production for export or production intended to replace goods
produced abroad. Large inflows of aid also tend to reduce real rates
of interest in the recipient country, thereby discouraging savings,
encouraging those who hold financial assets to place their holdings
abroad and creating incentives for local investors to adopt
techniques of production which are biased against the employment of
labour. When aid takes the form of subsidized exports of commodities,
the change in relative commodity prices can be devastating for local
producers...That is, agricultural subsidies in Europe, disguised as
foreign aid, are said to destroy the livelihood of some of the
poorest people on earth." When the goal of good governance was added
to the equation of economic growth and redistribution of income to
guarantee basic needs, modernization theory seemed to explain not
only that the economy was deformed, but so was government. "Third,
the availability of foreign aid has made it easier for the
governments of recipient countries to increase unproductive current
expenditure, to expand the military and to reduce taxation." And, in
the final analysis, "fourth, there is no evidence apart from the
occasional anecdote to suggest that either bilateral or multilateral
aid programmes have succeeded in reaching the poor. On the contrary,
most of the available evidence indicates that most of the benefits of
12
foreign assistance programmes are captured by middle and upper income
groups, i.e. by the élite." (Griffin and McKinley 1994, 4.
7. Inkeles and Smith in 1975 published a measure of modernization,
the so-called OM scale, based on their interviews with 6,000 people
in six developing countries in which they argue that modern attitudes
produce modern behaviour. "The modern man's character, as it emerges
from our study, may be summed up under four major headings. He is an
informed participant citizen; he has a marked sense of personal
efficacy; he is highly independent and autonomous in his relations to
traditional sources of influence, especially when making decisions
about how to conduct his personal affairs; and he is ready for new
experiences and ideas, that is, he is relatively openminded and
cognitively flexible." (161)
8. If only American scholars as well as politicians had been more
open to the insights of marxist thinkers. After all, Paul Baran in
1962 had written that, "Bolstering the political system of power
existing in backward countries by providing it with military support
may temporarily block the eruption of the volcano; it cannot stop the
subterranean gathering of explosive forces." (101) Given his marxist
presumptions, Baran did not anticipate combining the use of a
praetorian system, which strictly controlled eruptions, while
modernization proceeded rather than being retarded.
